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ABSTRACT 
Scholars increasingly use expressions such as “regulatory com-
petition” or even “law market” to illustrate the new global legal 
system and the rivalry between national laws. This paper scrutinizes 
the legitimacy of the application of such economic concepts to legal 
systems’ interactions. An economic analysis could allow us to, more 
precisely, delimit the factors of convergence (leading to unity) and 
divergence (leading to diversity) between national legal systems due 
to competitive strategies (namely differentiation and alignment) and 
the consequences for the regulation of legal systems’ interactions. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
To illustrate the effects of globalization on laws and on the law,1 
it is common today to refer to “regulatory competition” or even the 
“law market.”2 Therefore, legal experts are led to use economic con-
cepts such as “competition” and “market.”3 Do such concepts and 
the concomitant economic analysis allow for a better understanding 
of the contemporary global legal system and in particular the rela-
tionships between national legal systems?4 To what extent can we 
expect a better understanding of the trends towards unity or diversity 
of the law from an economic analysis of the behaviors related to law 
(namely lawmaking and legal mobility for law users)? 
The objective of this paper is to assess the legitimacy of applying 
these economic concepts to national legal systems. This paper also 
aims to demonstrate the fruitfulness of pursing an economic analysis 
of the relationships between national legal systems. First, the terms 
“competition” and “market” imply that there is some form of rivalry 
                                                                                                             
 1. T. Halliday & P. Osinsky, Globalization of Law, 32 ANN. REV. SOC. 447 
(2006); J.-B. AUBY, LA GLOBALISATION, LE DROIT ET L’ÉTAT (Montchrestien 
2003); H. P. Glenn, Droit mondial, droit mondialisé ou droit du monde, in DE 
TOUS HORIZON—MÉLANGES XAVIER BLANC-JOUVAN 259 (Société de législation 
comparée 2005).  
 2. H. P. GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD: SUSTAINABLE 
DIVERSITY IN LAW (Oxford U. Press 2010); GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE (G. 
Teubner ed., Dartmouth 1997).  
 3. A. MARCIANO & J. M. JOSSELIN, FROM ECONOMIC TO LEGAL 
COMPETITION—NEW PERSPECTIVES ON LAW AND INSTITUTIONS IN EUROPE (Ed-
ward Elgar Publ’g 2003); K. M. MEESSEN, ECONOMIC LAW AS AN ECONOMIC 
GOOD: ITS RULE FUNCTION AND ITS TOOL FUNCTION IN THE COMPETITION OF 
SYSTEMS (Sellier 2009); E. A. O’HARA & L. E. RIBSTEIN, THE LAW MARKET (Ox-
ford U. Press 2009); E. Carbonara & F. Parisi, Choice of Law and Legal Evolu-
tion: Rethinking the Market for Legal Rules, 139 PUB. CHOICE 461 (2009); D. C. 
Esty & D. Geradin, Regulatory Co-Opetition, 3(2) J. INT’L ECON. L. 235 (2000).  
 4. A. Ogus, Competition Between National Legal Systems: A Contribution 
of Economic Analysis to Comparative Law, 48(2) INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 405 
(1999); H. TJIONG, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGULATORY COMPETITION: A 
DIACHRONIC INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL CHANGE IN AN ERA OF 
GLOBALIZATION (VDM Verlag 2009).  
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between coexisting legal systems. However, are these notions rele-
vant? Are concepts taken from economic analysis truly applicable, 
or is it just a suggestive manner of speaking (i.e., a metaphor)? If so, 
we would be facing a case of importation of concepts elaborated in 
one discipline (namely economics) into another discipline (law); the 
use of the concept being more ideological than scientific. In fact, 
one may assume that some concepts are relevant whereas other ones 
are not. 
Second, careful economic analysis could allow us to delimit 
more precisely the factors of convergence and divergence between 
national legal systems pertaining to national competitive strategies. 
Following an economic approach, the current global trends of law 
towards unity or diversity can at least be partially analyzed because 
of combined individual strategic behaviors (interactions between 
states and law users). Describing the theoretical conditions of the 
application of economic analysis to lawmaking and to legal mobil-
ity, we will stress that the relevance of this approach depends on the 
characteristics of the different legal systems, which comparative law 
highlights. Before developing this idea, it is useful to give some pre-
liminary precisions. 
Of course, the answer given to the first question depends on the 
accepted meaning of a word such as “market.” The word market is 
polysemic. Therefore, an expression like law market does not have 
only one meaning. It may correspond to the market for legal services 
provided by lawyers. In this particular sense, there is undoubtedly a 
law market involving law firms, especially large international law 
firms that are competing intensively to meet the demand for sophis-
ticated legal advice coming from multinational corporations and 
large institutions.5 In a very different sense, the term “market” can 
be used in contrast to other general forms of organization of the 
economy, such as centrally managed economy based on state-
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owned enterprises.6 The market, thus, corresponds to the private 
sector and to all economic relations based on autonomous will and 
private property. However, the “law market” may also refer to the 
competition between the legal orders closely attached to different 
jurisdictions. We will show that countries do compete, through their 
legal systems, in order to attract players and businesses, but we can-
not posit that there is currently a national legal systems market. In 
other words, if we consider that the concept of a market is specific 
and not identical with that of competition, then there may be com-
petitive situations that are not based on the market mechanism. 
This point has key implications for the regulation of global in-
teraction between national legal systems. If a law market does not 
exist, it would be unrealistic to hope that such competitive relations 
could spontaneously lead to equilibrium. In classical and neoclassi-
cal economic theory, the market is described as a mechanism that 
has the capacity of allowing a set of actors who do not coordinate 
otherwise (by rules, routines, conventions, etc.) to achieve a satis-
factory situation in the sense that a deviation from this equilibrium 
would be disadvantageous. This theory is conceptually based on 
Adam Smith’s idea of the “invisible hand” of the market. Thus, a 
real market—in the sense of a specific economic mechanism—is a 
spontaneous order since the interactions between the economic ac-
tors lead to a balance without external public intervention. However, 
if the interaction between the legal systems is not exactly market-
based, it is therefore relevant to consider other ways of regulating 
competition between national legal systems to remedy possible per-
verse effects. Again, an analysis of the nature of economic relations 
between national legal orders provides a better understanding of the 
dynamics of legal systems. Indeed, to tackle the problem of norma-
tive competition, if it does not spontaneously balance itself, one of 
the actions lies in the harmonization of rules. In this case, normative 
                                                                                                             
 6. F. A. HAYEK, 1 LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY—RULES AND ORDER 
(U. of Chicago Press 1973).  
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competition, which in response calls for a policy of legal harmoni-
zation, indirectly feeds the convergence of national laws. Thus, in-
ternational legal harmonization appears to be a very important rem-
edy to these perverse effects and leads to unification.  
II. SPECIFICITY OF THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE RELATIONS 
BETWEEN NATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEMS 
As a preliminary point, it is necessary to situate this analysis 
amid the already vast economic analyses of national legal systems. 
Indeed, within the last few years, a number of economists have stud-
ied, comparatively and with an economic perspective, national legal 
systems or major families of legal systems (common law, civil law, 
etc.7), in order to highlight the importance of the legal factor in eco-
nomic development. We could mention, for instance, the pioneering 
work undertaken by R. La Porta, F. Lopes de Silanes, A. Schleifer 
and R. Vishny,8 and continued by the World Bank (Doing Business 
reports) along with research on legal origin.9 There is also a growing 
literature on law and development.10 This type of approach is also 
referred to as comparative law and economics.11 
Such economic work focuses on legal systems whereas the anal-
ysis that seems to be truly needed would focus on the relationships 
                                                                                                             
 7. R. DAVID & C. JAUFFRET-SPINOSI, LES GRANDS SYSTÈMES DE DROIT 
CONTEMPORAINS (Dalloz 2002); J. Vanderlinden, À propos des familles de droits 
en droit civil comparé, in HOMMAGE À RENÉ DEKKERS 359 (Bruylant 1982). 
 8. R. La Porta, F. Lopes-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer, & R. W. Vishny, Legal 
Determinants of External Finance, 52(3) J. FIN. 1131 (1997); R. La Porta, F. 
Lopes-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer & R. W. Vishny, Law & Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 
(1998). 
 9. E. L. Glaeser & A. Shleifer, Legal Origins, 107 Q. J. ECON. 1193 (2002); 
R. Michaels, Comparative Law by Numbers? Legal Origins Thesis, Doing Busi-
ness Reports, and the Silence of Traditional Comparative Law, 57 AM. J. COMP. 
L. 765 (2009); S. Djankov, E. L. Glaeser, R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes, & A. 
Shleifer, The New Comparative Economics, 31 J. COMP. ECON. 595 (2003).  
 10. D. Berkowitz, K. Pistor, & J.-F. Richard, Economic Development, Legal-
ity, and the Transplants Effect, 47 EUR. ECON. REV. 165 (2003).  
 11. U. MATTEI, COMPARATIVE LAW AND ECONOMICS (U. of Michigan Press 
1997) [hereinafter COMPARATIVE LAW AND ECONOMICS]; A. Ogus, Economic 
Analysis and Comparative Law, in MÉLANGES EN L’HONNEUR DE DENIS TALLON 
169 (Société de legislation comparée 2000).  
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between legal systems. The abovementioned works are macroeco-
nomic (i.e., they deal with the economic performance of coun-
tries).12 Whereas the understanding of the interactions between legal 
systems implies the elaboration of a theory of players and actions 
and, therefore, an approach based on microeconomics.13 
If economic comparisons of legal systems are not very helpful 
for analyzing the interactions between national legal systems, we 
can note that they are not completely irrelevant to the matter of this 
study. Indeed, the comparative macro-econometric analysis of legal 
systems has contributed to making countries and players aware of 
the idea that national legal systems compete and can be ranked ac-
cording to their economic merits. Moreover, the composing princi-
ples of these rankings and the underlying ideology (i.e., the idea of 
an economic superiority of common law over systems of civil law, 
itself related to the liberal preference for self-regulation or judiciary 
regulation over the so-called tendency for the countries of civil tra-
dition to intervene in the economy14) suggest a policy of alignment 
of national legal systems with those legal systems presented as the 
most efficient from an economic point of view. This is one of the 
competitive dynamics that we will come back to. 
One may assume that the intrinsic economic efficiency of the 
different legal systems is not a well-established theory.15 A histori-
                                                                                                             
 12. N. Garoupa & T. Ginsburg, Economic Analysis and Comparative Law, in 
COMPARATIVE LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 11, at 58; F. Faust, Comparative 
Law and Economic Analysis of Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
COMPARATIVE LAW 837 (M. Reimann & R. Zimmermann eds., Oxford U. Press 
2006); G. DE GEEST, ECONOMICS OF COMPARATIVE LAW (Edward Elgar Publ’g 
2009).  
 13. H. R. Varian, Microeconomics, in THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY 
OF ECONOMICS 461 (Macmillan 1987); H. R. VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS (3d ed., W. W. Norton & Co. 1992).  
 14. See World Bank, International Finance Corporation, & Oxford University 
Press, Doing Business in 2004—Understanding Regulation at XIV (Washington, 
D.C. 2004); P. G. Mahoney, The Common Law and Economic Growth: Hayek 
Might Be Right, 30(2) J. LEGAL STUD. 503 (2001). 
 15. This theory has generated critical reactions, both from economists and 
lawyers (e.g., J. Klick, B. Deffains, J. Armour, Association Henri Capitant).  
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cal overview of the relations between the law and economic devel-
opment shows that legal systems that are currently viewed as rela-
tively economically inefficient (e.g., France, Italia, or Germany)  
compared to common law systems (e.g., England, U.S., Singapore), 
have been linked to remarkable periods of economic take-off and 
sustained growth.16 Furthermore, fast-growing economies, such as 
that of China, are not based on legal frameworks that are usually 
viewed as conducive to economic development. Therefore, the eco-
nomic attractiveness of laws is not based, or at least not only based, 
on the substance of laws, but also on the legal systems’ position in 
the market (i.e., on their relative position compared to the other 
ones) regardless of content. Also, the choice made by lawmakers to 
specifically position their legal systems can be analyzed with the 
analytical tools provided by economic theory. 
III. THE APPLICATION OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS TO THE 
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN NATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEMS 
Economic analysis was first established to explain activities that 
seemed fundamentally economic in nature, such as the production 
or exchange of goods. In this view, law does not seem to be an eco-
nomic matter. It is a component of the economic environment (i.e., 
a piece of data that economists may take into account), but it is not 
the main area of investigation. The general framework of economic 
analysis, however, has a broader scope of application (sometimes 
described as “economic imperialism”17). Faced with the challenge 
of explaining how economic agents can mobilize limited resources 
                                                                                                             
 16. D. C. NORTH & R. P. THOMAS, THE RISE OF THE WESTERN WORLD: A 
NEW ECONOMIC HISTORY 1-8, 120-131 (Cambridge U. Press 1973).  
 17. G. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR (U. of 
Chicago Press 1976); D. FRIEDMAN, LAW'S ORDER: WHAT ECONOMICS HAS TO 
DO WITH LAW AND WHY IT MATTERS (Princeton U. Press 2000); R. H. Coase, 
Economics and Contiguous Disciplines, 7(2) J. LEGAL STUD. 201 (1978).  
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to best satisfy their interests, economic analysis has become a gen-
eral theory of choices under constraint18 and of rational behavior.19 
If we adopt this abstract conception of economic analysis, it is 
possible to apply it to the system composed of the different national 
legal systems.20 The contemporary global legal system can indeed 
be modeled as a universe in which different players (countries) pro-
duce a particular object (norms and judiciary institutions) that other 
players (individuals, businesses, NGOs) choose to use.21 This theo-
retical framework was originally provided by Charles Tiebout’s 
analysis of jurisdictional competition.22 
The relevance of this model is based on the assumption that law 
can be chosen, both by the lawmakers (who design the law) and by 
the law users (who choose the governing law or the dispute resolu-
tion mechanism).23 Some long-term evolutions contribute to making 
this hypothesis realistic. However, at this stage in the development 
of law in the world, the legal malleability and the legal mobility are 
only partially true in reality. 
As far as the law users’ point of view is concerned, the real pos-
sibility of choosing the law has to be verified. There must be con-
crete mechanisms enabling the choice of one legal system over an-
other; this constitutes the assumption of “legal mobility.”24 We shall 
                                                                                                             
 18. See Robbins’ definition of economics: “Economics is the science which 
studies human behaviour as a relationship between ends and scarce means which 
have alternative uses,” L. ROBBINS, AN ESSAY ON THE NATURE AND 
SIGNIFICANCE OF ECONOMIC SCIENCE 15 (Macmillan 1932). 
 19. P. VAN PARIJS, LE MODÈLE ÉCONOMIQUE ET SES RIVAUX (Librairie Droz 
1990). 
 20. Legal systems likely to compete against one another are not limited to 
national systems, since supranational legal systems (in particular European Union 
Law) and international legal systems (e.g., lex mercatoria) may compete with na-
tional legal systems.  
 21. R. Romano, The Need for Competition in International Securities Regu-
lation, 2(2) THEORETICAL INQUIRIES LAW 387 (2001). 
 22. C. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64(5) J. POL. ECON. 
416 (1956).  
 23. J. M. Smith, Legal Engineering in an Age of Globalisation: Is There a 
Future for Jurisdictional Competition?, in LEGAL ENGINEERING AND 
COMPARATIVE LAW 51 (E. C. Ritaine et al. eds., Schulthess 2008).  
 24. O’HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra, note 3; L. E. Ribstein, Choosing Law by 
Contract, 18 J. CORP. L. 245 (1993).  
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distinguish two main mechanisms that allow economic or social ac-
tors to choose a legal system: 
The physical mobility that enables them to settle in the territory 
of a country whose legal system they want to adopt (assuming that 
the criterion of applicability of the law is territorial); 
The will that enables them to directly choose the applicable law 
for a specific transaction (e.g., a clause of governing law in interna-
tional contracts) or for an organization (incorporating a business in 
a country whose corporate law one wants to apply, regardless of the 
location of the actual headquarters, in legal systems that do not apply 
the seat-of-administration rule). 
Thus, legal mobility is the result of a combination of legal fac-
tors (free movement of goods, services, people, and money; free 
trade, territoriality of law, national sovereignty, etc.) and non-legal 
factors (economic globalization, information and communications 
technologies, drastic decrease in transportation costs, the existence 
of a global language, etc.). Legal professionals with international 
networks and global consulting firms ready to provide services to 
global groups play an important role in promoting and implementing 
this legal mobility. 
On the supply side, we shall insist on an essential point. The 
economic model is applicable to the international legal system be-
cause the national legal systems may be chosen. This relationship of 
choice opens a field of possibilities. There are two implications: 
first, law users must have a choice to make from among several legal 
systems; second, lawmakers must have the power to change the law. 
Conversely, some structures of the global legal system are not 
compatible with a choice-based economic analysis. National legal 
systems may not be chosen by individuals and businesses for several 
reasons, such as the following: 
− because laws are not mainly based on territories, in particular 
national territories (e.g., laws are clan based, as they used to be 
during the early medieval period); 
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− because there is only one applicable law to a given matter, with-
out any alternative solution (e.g., the jus commune hypothesis, 
which explains for instance why there is no competition between 
national canon laws); 
− because there is no room left for a choice between coexisting 
legal systems (i.e., situation of strictly compartmented national 
legal systems. For this reason, we cannot say that North and 
South Korean legal systems compete—they are simply foreign 
to one another). 
The propensity of states to implement competition-seeking strate-
gies based on legal solutions in line with the market depends on the 
characteristics of the national legal systems. Laws are actually more 
or less likely to be modified in response to governments’ willingness 
to adopt strategic positions. There are two reasons for limiting the 
malleability of laws. First, the law of a country may not be likely to 
be changed by the state because the law is not primarily a product 
of the political will (as it is the case for statute law), but rather the 
fruit of judges’ wisdom (case law), the practice of lawyers, or social 
traditions (customary law).25 Second, the intensity of the relation-
ship between the national legal system and a nation varies signifi-
cantly from one country to another. When the law has played a very 
important role in the constitution of a state and in the self-conscious-
ness of the people, it is unlikely that the government will be able to 
modify easily the law to attract foreign actors. 
In a country like France, the Civil Code resembles a civil “con-
stitution” as Jean Carbonnier put it, after Demolombe.26 It is a fun-
damental historical landmark (lieu de mémoire27). Therefore, it is 
difficult to imagine that the venerable Civil Code could be replaced 
by another system of law regulating private relations without the 
                                                                                                             
 25. N. Garoupa & A. Ogus, A Strategic Interpretation of Legal Transplants, 
35 J. LEGAL STUD. 339 (2006).  
 26. P. Mazeaud, Le code civil et la conscience collective française, 3 
POUVOIRS 152 (2004). 
 27. J. Carbonnier, Le code civil, in LES LIEUX DE MÉMOIRE III 293 (P. Nora 
ed., Gallimard 1986).  
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French national identity being profoundly affected. In the same way, 
the English people have an extreme attachment to the Common law. 
The transformation of the British legal system under the influence 
of European law has given rise to considerable reactions of mistrust 
and rejection. The nostalgia for a return to English law, free from 
any European influence, has recently emerged as an important argu-
ment in the public debate on Brexit. Certain legal systems are very 
strongly linked to a specific legal tradition and the legal systems of 
the same family.28 For instance, legal systems of countries from the 
“new world” are generally very dependent on their seminal laws, as 
it is the case for Australian law with respect to English law. The 
dependent legal systems can provide some differentiations com-
pared to the seminal law, but they remain limited, except in the case 
of mixed legal systems.29 
Examining the conditions for the application of economic anal-
ysis to national legal systems is an opportunity for us to emphasize 
that the relevance of economic interpretation is not merely theoreti-
cal. The validity of the application of microeconomic analysis to le-
gal systems depends on the characteristics of the legal systems as 
historical evolutions made them. The more legal systems are based 
on written law and contingent regulations, the more the assumption 
of legal malleability is relevant. Detailed regulations can be changed 
easily by political will.30 Therefore, states will be more likely to 
adopt policies strategically in order to position their law compared 
to the other legal systems. Moreover, countries whose legal culture 
is mild and where law is not a structuring element of national self-
consciousness can most easily carry out strategic reorientations. 
                                                                                                             
 28. K. ZWEIGERT & H. KÖTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 
(Oxford U. Press 1998).  
 29. K. REID, D. VISSER, & R. ZIMMERMANN, MIXED LEGAL SYSTEMS IN 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE: PROPERTY AND OBLIGATIONS IN SCOTLAND AND 
SOUTH AFRICA (Oxford U. Press 2005).  
 30. P. Legrand, The Impossibility of ‘Legal Transplants’, 4(2) MAASTRICHT 
J. EUR. & COMP. L. 111 (1997).  
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The relevance of applying the economic model to national legal 
systems is, therefore, dependent upon the level of development of 
the global legal system, which needs to be composed of different 
national systems that are independent from one another, and rela-
tively substitutable (i.e., largely capable of assuming the same func-
tions,31 following a classical view in comparative law theory). Com-
petitive oriented lawmaking is, thus, perhaps only one explanatory 
factor. 
IV. RELEVANT ECONOMIC CONCEPTS: REGULATORY COMPETITION 
BUT NO MARKET FOR LEGAL SYSTEMS 
After showing that the structure of the contemporary interna-
tional legal system allows us to apply economic analysis, we need 
to determine which economic concept is appropriate for illustrating 
the relationships among national legal systems. 
On the one hand, the economic notion of competition is rele-
vant.32 We can state that national legal systems compete because 
countries try, through their legal systems, to be attractive for eco-
nomic actors and businesses, and to acquire international influence. 
States provide the legal rules and institutions that best suit actors’ 
individual preferences. Furthermore, mobile economic actors, par-
ticularly businesses, seek to take advantage of the heterogeneity of 
the global legal system by choosing laws most profitable for them. 
That is why national or state corporate laws are seen as competing 
laws.33 Nonetheless, economic motivations are not the only deter-
miners of behaviors. Profit is not the only motivation in search of 
                                                                                                             
 31. E. RABEL, AUFGABE UND NOTWENDIGKEIT DER RECHTSVERGLEICHUNG 
(Hueber 1925). 
 32. U. Mattei & F. Pulitini, A Competitive Model of Legal Rules, in THE 
COMPETITIVE STATE: VILLA COLOMBELLA PAPERS ON COMPETITIVE POLITICS 
207 (A. L. Breton et al., Kluwer 1991). 
 33. L. A. Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits 
on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435 (1992); W. L. 
Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83(4) YALE 
L. J. 663 (1974); R. Romano, Law as Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation 
Puzzle, J. L., ECON. & ORG. 225 (1985); R. Romano, The State Competition De-
bate in Corporate Law, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 709 (1987).  
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the most appropriate jurisdiction. They may also be interested in the 
fact that certain values are recognized and promoted in some terri-
tories rather than in others. For instance, same-sex couples may 
leave their country of origin to have access to the possibility of get-
ting married in another country.34 
On the other hand, the notion of a market does not seem appli-
cable to the relationships between national legal systems. The mar-
ket is a bilateral relation of exchange.35 In the market, each player 
gives and receives something and rationally tries to obtain the best 
ratio between the things exchanged. One of the elements of such 
exchange is often the payment of a sum of money. The best price 
needs to be found—the highest for the seller and the lowest for the 
buyer. In the case of relationships between countries and law users, 
this bilateral exchange usually does not exist, meaning that contract-
ing parties who choose a particular governing law in their agreement 
do not have to pay anything to that country. Sometimes, a fee is re-
quired upon completion of a formality in a given legal system (e.g., 
incorporation of a business). However, this represents more the ac-
tual price of the formality rather than a payment for access to the 
legal system. Note that situations where a tax is directly attached to 
the choice of a law are actually quite rare. 
Some might object to the concept of the market that we consider 
in our reasoning because it is inspired by the market for goods and 
services. Some might also believe that there is no reason why this 
                                                                                                             
 34. J. G. Brown, Competitive Federalism and Legislative Incentives to Rec-
ognize Same-Sex Marriage in the USA, in INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY 
COMPETITION AND COORDINATION: PERSPECTIVES ON ECONOMIC REGULATION IN 
EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 257 (W. W. Bratton, J. McCahery, S. Piciotto, 
& C. Scott eds., Clarendon Press 1996) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL 
REGULATORY COMPETITION AND COORDINATION]; J. L. Grossman, Resurrecting 
Comity: Revisiting the Problem of Non-Uniform Marriage Laws, 84 OR. L. REV. 
433 (2005).  
 35. K. BAIN & P. G. A. HOWELLS, UNDERSTANDING MARKET: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY, INSTITUTIONS AND PRACTICE OF MARKETS (Har-
vester-Wheatsheaf 1988); O. FAVEREAU & E. LAZEGA, CONVENTIONS AND 
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concept should be applicable to the relations between legal systems 
because the law is not immediately seen as a good or a service. Nev-
ertheless, many authors who refer to “law market” or to the “market 
for legal systems” easily see the law as a good (a set of rules) or as 
a service (an institution that allows economic and social actors to 
achieve specific objectives).36 It should also be emphasized that the 
market not only applies to goods and services, but it can also be used 
to describe the functioning of the “labor market” or the “capital mar-
ket.” Therefore, the field of application of the concept of “market” 
is broader than the field of trade in goods and services. However, 
this field of application is not unlimited. The specific criterion of the 
market is the possibility of arranging the exchange based on the re-
lationship between the terms exchanged. If the conditions of a bilat-
eral exchange are unquantifiable, are not independent from one an-
other, or if one of the conditions of the bilateral exchange does not 
exist, then there is no genuine market. 
The idea of the law market is based on the assumption that states 
are interested in making their law attractive because they receive 
taxes from entities (persons or companies) that choose their law. 
This idea should be challenged. If the location of an activity deter-
mines the applicable law and taxation at the same time, theoretically 
it may be expected that there will be an indirect correlation between 
the applicable law and the taxes to be paid to the state. Under this 
hypothesis, the state is both the lawmaker and the recipient of tax 
revenue, whereas the entity who chooses the law is also the taxpayer. 
However, it should be made clear that the actual behavior of people 
and firms who play with the diversity of legal and tax systems does 
not fit with this theory. Indeed, players who benefit from legal mo-
bility elaborate sophisticated strategies to avoid the linkage between 
tax and laws. Multinational groups and even medium-sized compa-
nies do not just locate activities where the tax rates are the lowest, 
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they combine the locations of the different components of their busi-
nesses (e.g., intellectual property, headquarters, labor, place of list-
ing, contracts, inputs) to largely avoid taxation. If the measures cre-
ated by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment (OECD) to combat tax avoidance are successful, some of the 
most shocking excesses in tax optimization strategies related to tax 
rulings and circumvention of stable establishments should decrease 
in the future. The Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS), an 
OECD initiative, aims at preventing the exploitation of gaps and 
mismatches in tax rules to shift profits artificially to low or tax-free 
locations. However, the idea that actors can take advantage of the 
plurality of national legal and tax systems to adopt laws without nec-
essarily being subject to the accompanying taxation structure is not 
over. 
Economic analysis, therefore, enables us to show that national 
legal systems do compete, but that in the absence of compensation 
for the offering of laws by countries, there is no such thing as a mar-
ket for legal systems or a law market. 
V. NATIONAL STRATEGIES OF DIFFERENTIATION AND ALIGNMENT 
IN REGULATORY COMPETITION 
This finding enlightens the understanding of interactions be-
tween national legal systems. If we consider the relations between 
legal systems from the perspective of competition, we can outline 
two economic dynamics that contribute to frame the global legal 
system. These forces are, moreover, contradictory. They correspond 
to two opposite strategies that countries are likely to pursue ration-
ally in order to oppose (defensive strategy)37 or take advantage of 
(offensive strategy) the competition that exists between legal sys-
tems.38 
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The first strategy consists of a legal system distinguishing itself 
from the existing regulatory or legal offer, including acting as a free-
rider in a unification process. A country may aim at accentuating the 
originality of its legal system to obtain a competitive advantage. For 
instance, some countries have historically chosen to adopt strict reg-
ulations regarding bank secrecy. Jurisdictions where bankers face 
serious criminal charges when they communicate information about 
their clients, even when requested by national tax administrations, 
gave rise to geographic centers specializing in wealth management 
(e.g., Switzerland, Luxembourg, Lebanon, Singapore).39 Several de-
grees of bank secrecy correspond to various legal preferences and 
economic specializations. Thus, from a broader point of view, the 
differentiation strategies stimulate the diversity of law. 
This policy is strategic in the sense that the efficiency of choos-
ing to differentiate a legal system depends on the other countries’ 
reactions. If the other legal systems quickly align themselves with 
the position of the innovative lawmaker, the latter must again pro-
duce an innovation to retain its advantage over the others, and so on. 
Thus, lawmakers’ strategies stimulate the volatility of law and not 
only its diversity. Sometimes, there is a persistent premium for the 
first mover. For instance, Luxembourg tries to keep its leading po-
sition in the market of the administration of investment funds 
through a swift transposition of the European directives governing 
the different categories of investment funds, e.g., Undertakings for 
Collective Investments in Transferable Securities (UCITS) and Al-
ternative Investment Funds (AIF). 
The valuable differentiation does not need to be very significant. 
There are two types of differences between legal systems. A na-
tional law can be distinguished from another national law by differ-
ent parameters within the same paradigm. For example, one country 
may choose that cars must drive on the right, while another may 
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choose the opposite, but in both cases the structure of the rule is the 
same. In the same sense, the lawmakers may decide different maxi-
mum numbers of directors, but in any case, boards will oversee the 
activities of corporations and the number of seats in the boardroom 
will be capped. However, the legal systems can also be distinguished 
more deeply according to their general approach to matters. Deep 
differences make legal concepts very difficult to translate from one 
language to another. For example, the concept of remedies has no 
equivalent in the French language.40  
A competitive advantage based on a particular legal tool or set 
of rules may be an effect of a micro-differentiation. The legal attrac-
tiveness is not correlated with the size of the gap with other legal 
systems. This leads to the conclusion that the legal diversity pro-
duced by lawmakers’ strategies can be more intense (number of dif-
ferentiations) than deep (magnitude of the differentiations). In this 
regard, the economic and strategic aspect of differentiation contrasts 
with the legal diversity that is produced by the historic development 
of particular separated legal traditions. The divergence between the 
English common law and the French civil law tradition is obviously 
not the effect of legal strategies of France and England.41 In this 
case, the legal diversity is probably deeper but slower (the differ-
ences are rooted in long-term process).  
The second strategy consists of a system aligning itself with an 
existing offer. In terms of competition, it can be risky to propose an 
original law without losing a lot of influence. It can be preferable to 
align with one of the existing dominant legal systems, also called 
“origins” by Garoupa and Ogus.42 In the language that is common 
among comparative lawyers, it is a massive legal transplantation 
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process.43 English, U.S., French, and German laws are international 
standards in terms of legal systems. Alignment with dominant legal 
systems gives some advantages.44 Such aligned national legal sys-
tems benefit from the image and the knowledge that international 
players already have of them. Regardless of their inherent qualities, 
familiarity is an important quality when choosing one legal system 
over another.45 For example, given the number of U.S. and UK in-
vestors, international business law tends to favor legal solutions 
close to Anglo-American legal practices. 
Moroccan law provides a good example of a legal system that 
has generally chosen to follow French law. During the colonial pe-
riod, French law was the basic law (except for family law and per-
sonal status) and the legal matrix of modern Moroccan law. Moroc-
can law could then have emancipated itself from French law or 
adopted another legal system as a model. That is not what happened. 
Moroccan law has continued to be largely inspired by French law, 
under the influence of Moroccan lawyers often trained in French 
universities and through cooperation with the French administra-
tions and jurisdictions. Thus, French law inspires new laws (e.g., 
telecommunications regulation), the adaptation of certain laws (e.g., 
company law), and the courts’ interpretations, which often take 
French case law as a benchmark. This long-term inspiration has sev-
eral advantages for Morocco (and for France). It facilitates the inter-
national training of Moroccan lawyers in universities in France, Bel-
gium, and Quebec. It also encourages the establishment of foreign 
companies on Moroccan territory, in order to take advantage of eco-
nomic opportunities specific to the country, but also to serve as a 
hub for the development of activities in French-speaking Africa. 
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Casablanca could not have become one of the main legal and finan-
cial hubs in Africa if Morocco had not adopted one of the main in-
ternational legal standards. 
One can hesitate between two explanations for this alignment of 
Moroccan law with French law.46 According to a first theory (which 
could be called neocolonial), Morocco remains under the political 
influence of France. Its autonomy would remain limited and the for-
mer colonial power would have the means to weigh on its choices. 
However, it can be observed that the U.S. has also influenced Mo-
rocco’s policy in the geopolitical context of the Cold War. However, 
Morocco has hardly been tempted to be open to the U.S. legal influ-
ence. According to the second theory, it is a rational economic cal-
culation that led Morocco to adhere to French law. In fact, the two 
theories are not incompatible. Sharing a common legal culture that 
affects both institutions and individuals can result in both political 
influences and well-understood economic interests. 
Whatever the cause, it seems certain that the policies of align-
ment with an international legal standard contribute to reducing the 
legal diversity and reinforces a “market structure” that tends to take 
the form of an oligopoly. Following this dynamic, the world legal 
system is structured around three to four major legal traditions, as 
showed in the comparative law literature. 
Thus, we can see that economic analysis of relations between 
legal systems enables us to highlight two original factors of conver-
gence or divergence: competitive strategies of differentiation, and 
strategies of alignment with dominant standards. 
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VI. REGULATION OF THE COMPETITIVE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
NATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEMS 
Economic analysis is not only useful to explain the current state 
of things, but also to shed light on how things should be, in terms of 
relationships between national legal systems.47 First, the structure of 
relations between national legal systems presented earlier contrib-
utes to the discussion pertaining to the merits of regulatory compe-
tition.48 Regulatory competition is indeed a controversial position of 
legal policy.49 Some scholars stress the expected advantages. Com-
petition between legal systems is supposed to squeeze out the least 
efficient processes and regulatory measures that are also the most 
expensive for users, as they would stop being used. Regulatory com-
petition is also supposed to make the most appropriate legal solu-
tions available so that the user rapidly prospers. Therefore, it should 
lead to a general improvement of law. Another argument consists of 
saying that if legal systems compete, countries will be encouraged 
to offer a diversity of legal systems expressing political options as 
diverse as the expectations and preferences of citizens and busi-
nesses, in particular in terms of fiscal and social matters, from 
among which economic and social players may choose.50 This type 
of argument is based, implicitly or explicitly, on Adam Smith's the-
ory of the “invisible hand of the market.” Competition is supposed 
to lead every player in the system, while pursuing their own individ-
ual interests, to contribute to a globally profitable result.                          
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The dynamics of competing legal systems would lead to a virtu-
ous equilibrium.51 However, the major weakness of this argument is 
the fact that such a law market does not exist, as we demonstrated 
above. Also, said equilibrium, in particular between laws offered by 
countries, and compensation obtained by them, cannot exist. It could 
be otherwise only if the fiscal resources of each country were strictly 
correlated to the adherence of a player or a business to the law of 
that country. Yet, as we know, the global legal system offers a huge 
variety of legal, fiscal, and social choices for global players. In ad-
dition, the rules, legal tools, and regulatory constrains can be com-
bined. A complex policy of localization of assets, employees, com-
pany headquarters, and transactions, generates the possibility of dis-
sociating the legal systems that are applicable to a player or a trans-
action.52 
As the relations between national legal systems correspond to a 
competitive relationship that is not a genuine market, it is unrealistic 
to hope for self-regulation between national legal systems. Unfair 
tax competition, the regulatory race to the bottom, and social dump-
ing53 are well-known perverse effects of regulatory competition.54 
They require corrective measures that can only be external as they 
cannot take the form of the immanent, spontaneous, and automatic 
corrective action that characterizes the market. Initiatives taken by 
countries in the European Union55 or the OECD against unfair tax 
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competition constitute interesting examples of such control of regu-
latory competition. Certain forms of harmonization such as the es-
tablishment of social and economic standards (e.g., minimal wages, 
maximum working time) are other ways of overseeing competition 
between national systems.56 In other words, regulatory competition 
should be mitigated and circumscribed through state cooperation.57 
Economic analysis provides criteria for deciding when legal harmo-
nization is required due to transboundary externalities for instance.58 
Thus, if we take into account the reaction of states and interna-
tional organizations to the perverse effects of regulatory competi-
tion, we perceive a second force that leads to the convergence be-
tween the legal systems. Sometimes, the multiplicity of national le-
gal solutions tends to be abolished and replaced by a single interna-
tional standard, through cooperatives dynamics.59 In other cases, a 
top-down or consensual position on harmonization will lead to the 
limitation of diversity of national legal systems, within the limits 
that will be set up. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
An economic analysis of the relations among international legal 
systems shows that laws are in a relationship of competition. Nev-
ertheless, competition does not equate to a real market likely to func-
tion without any external regulation. It also highlights the original 
forces contributing to a dynamic international legal system. Differ-
entiation strategies feed divergence between legal systems, while 
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alignment strategies constitute a vector of convergence between na-
tional legal systems. The latter trend is also enhanced by the harmo-
nization promoted as a remedy to the drifts of non-self-regulated 
regulatory competition.  
 
